Monero General Monero Discussion Started Aug 25, 2026 11:50 PM

Introduction to Cold Storage

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Aug 25, 2026 11:50 PM Last edited Aug 25, 2026 11:51 PM
#1
security opsec cold storage coldcard airgap
  • This is an opsec guide for crypto cold storage.

  • Opsec is a lifelong journey; there is no complete and final solution. Protect yourself at all times.

  • Your opsec strategy must be appropriate to the threat model. More money or illegal operations = more risk.

  • Impeccable opsec is easiest for Monero, and hardest (although technically possible) for interaction with certain smart contracts.

  • I will be working on software to fill in the gaps to make this method as convenient as possible (for my needs and maybe yours too).

  • This guide assumes familiarity with basic cryptocurrency concepts like private keys, nodes, transactions, bitcoin, monero, smart contracts.

  • This guide does not contain technical implementation guidance because that would make it too long.

  • This guide does not mention physical security. Situational awareness is essential.

  • If you have any questions please ask.

  • AI free guide.

  • I'm not an authority on anything. Think for your fucking self!

  • This method is for saving money / long term storage / investment / high value trading accounts. Not day to day transactions.


Contents


Foundation
Layer 1- Physical Entropy Keys
Layer 2- Cold Device
Layer 3- Air Gap
Layer 4- Decoy and Activation Keys

Trust
Layer 5- Trusted Software
Layer 6- Trusted Swaps

Pseudonymity
Layer 7- Protected IP
Layer 8- Compartmentalization


Foundation:


Physical Entropy Keys:

  • As we saw with the Coldcard exploit, your wallets are only as secure as the entropy (randomness) used to generate the seed.
  • Generating this entropy computationally might be vulnerable to exploits, and is impossible to conclusively verify.
  • The surest way to get secure keys with sufficient entropy is to manually generate entropy by rolling dice.
  • 99 dice rolls contains enough entropy for a secure 24 word seed phrase (using words from the BIP-39 word list)

Cold Device:

  • If your private keys are ever exposed to any device connected to the internet, then they might be stolen by software exploits.
  • Only expose your keys to hardware that has had its radio's physically removed.
  • Never use hardware that is specifically sold for crypto cold storage.
  • Run tails to minimize the risk of private keys being recoverable from your hardware between sessions.

Air Gap:

  • Signing and broadcasting transactions requires some communication between your cold device and an internet connected device.
  • It is therefore an unavoidable risk that a software exploit might leak your keys in this communication.
  • To minimize the attack surface, and to make the process fully auditable, all communications must use QR codes and never wires or radios (wifi/Bluetooth).
  • To update the cold device, use a fresh memory stick every time to prevent the stick itself from leaking your keys.
  • For Monero, this is easy using Feather Wallet on both devices.
  • For Bitcoin, its even easier using Sparrow Wallet on both devices.
  • Other blockchains lack convenient support for this but I am working on support for certain chains.

Decoy and Activation Keys:

  • All crypto custodians are vulnerable to wrench attacks, where an attacker uses violence to coerce them into revealing keys.
  • Multi-sig wallets allow the custodian to guarantee the safety of their money, but might do nothing to stop the violence; is it worth getting tortured to death because your attacker does not trust that you can't access the money anyway?
  • The best defense is obviously to avoid being a known, easy or valuable target. However, the vulnerability cannot be eliminated.
  • Sometimes a wrench attack stops upon discovery of a decoy wallet (with decoy funds); you keep your money, life and some teeth.
  • There is a convenient way to store your keys which is both easy to manage and allows you to surrender your cold device if coerced and only lose your decoy wallet.
  • For every crypto that you want, store the keys for decoy wallets on your tails stick. These might change over time.
  • Store one master key on paper. This is inputted when making transactions, but should never be digitally stored.
  • Use a software to multiply the master key with each of your decoy wallet keys to derive your actual wallet keys.

Trust:


Trusted Software:

  • Even despite maintaining an impeccable air gap, it is possible for compromised wallet software to leak your seed through qr codes, or to sign fraudulent transaction.
  • This risk is avoided using highly reputable, open source and extensively audited software.
  • If your write your own software, it is essential to follow supply chain best practices during installation.
  • If you use existing software, it is essential to verify hashes against multiple official sources to guarantee legitimacy.

Trusted Swaps:

  • When interacting with any swap, there is the potential to lose funds.
  • When interacting with any smart contract, there is the potential for your entire account to be drained.
  • Split funds into different accounts if interacting with complex smart contracts.
  • Limit the amount of money transmitted in any given swap.
  • Use the most reputable, open source and extensively audited swap services.
  • Prefer permissionless swaps where possible (like thorchain) and otherwise prefer no KYC swaps.
  • It is not unlikely that KYC swaps will leak your information to wrenchers.

Pseudonymity:


Protected IP:

  • If you IP address is associated with your onchain identity then you are a good target for wrenchers.
  • Using a VPN alone is not sufficient protection because you cannot verify that they don't keep logs.
  • Using Monero over tor is the easiest solution.
  • Using other cryptos over tor is more complicated and often requires communicating with public nodes that expose tor endpoints.
  • Be careful not to expose your identity by using public blockchain explorers.

Compartmentalization:

  • There is always a high risk that your onchain identity is tracked, connected to your IP address, or otherwise connected to your person.
  • This is useful for both government and criminal adversaries.
  • The impact of this risk can be limited by compartmentalization: using different isolated accounts for different funds at different times.
  • This is achieved using Monero!
  • Once per year (for example) use all your crypto to buy monero.
  • Then use monero to buy back your cryptos, one by one, keeping the transactions isolated.
  • Be vigilant to prevent metadata from revealing links between accounts, for example by temporal/cluster analysis or digital fingerprinting.
  • This prevents your accounts from being associated with each other or tracked across time.
  • You have the option to leave behind apparent losses to support an alibi of lost funds; 'lost it all on nfts and memecoins' might be more believable than 'boating accident'.

Bonus security tip:


VeraCrypt Tentacle Porn:

  • It would be better that nobody knows you have cold storage hardware or software at all.
  • If you are worried about your tails stick being seized by police and being forced to reveal the password, there is a special method to avoid further suspicion.
  • Use VeraCrypt to put an encrypted data partition on the stick, containing all the cold storage software and decoy keys.
  • VeraCrypt can be configured so that a second password decrypts a second data volume containing something else, and the primary data volume is hidden but not destroyed. (a miracle of encryption)
  • The hidden data volume should be embarrassing or incriminating, to justify being hidden on an encrypted stick, but nothing to do with crypto.
  • For example, put mountains of tentacle porn and other fetish material, and act all embarrassed when its discovered.
  • Now they think you're a paranoid pervert rather than a crypto custodian. They'll have a good laugh, diffuse the tension of suspicion and you can move on.

Summary


  • Keep your private keys secure.
  • Beware of wrench attacks and software exploits.
  • Stack redundant security measures to minimize risks.
  • Minimize reliance on trust.
  • Use decoys as the final layer of defense.

Thankyou for reading :D

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Replies

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Aug 26, 2026 1:39 AM
#2

@Nebuchadnezzar_II score one for tentacle porn :)

Seriously though, great write up

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2 thanks - Nebuchadnezzar_II, Hamzabutt112 - 0 tippers
Aug 26, 2026 11:05 AM
#4

good thread
regarding the entropy rolling dice thing no clue what's that about but pretty sure the offline paper wallet generator has enough entropy no?:
https://github.com/moneromooo-monero/monero-wallet-generator
like, can download the .html thing, drag n drop it to a browser even on a computer that's offline and it'll generate wallet
live version for it can be found over there:
https://web.getmonero.org/generator/
and right below the "generate wallet" button, there's a custom entropy field thing where can input text (like just random characters type thing), it says:
Custom entropy for deterministic wallet (leave empty to use the browser's PRNG):

i mean, for example the bitcoin one over there:
https://www.bitaddress.org
can do the whole moving mouse cursor for that entropy thing

but the one from monero over there:
https://web.getmonero.org/generator/
is just typing random character, i guess is pretty much the same thing?

there's also an other version of the monero paper wallet generator over there:
https://jollymort.github.io/monero-wallet-generator/
with the "Dice (d6)" version over there:
https://jollymort.github.io/monero-wallet-generator/monero-wallet-generator-d6.html
and the "Coin flip (d2)" version over there:
https://jollymort.github.io/monero-wallet-generator/monero-wallet-generator-d2.html

like idk, pretty much just been using the original one:
https://github.com/moneromooo-monero/monero-wallet-generator

which i guess since OP also mentioned "decoy wallet"
well, could do that with that, send some coin to a generated paper wallet then in case of home invasion or somethin then that would be the decoy wallet to give away with not all of the funds but some of the funds type thing
with like, the 25 words mnemonic seed writen on a piece of paper or somethin

1 thanks - nemesis - 0 tippers
Aug 26, 2026 4:00 PM
#5

@cipherchan
Hello, thankyou for you comment :)
Thats the right idea about seed generation. A trustworthy wallet can indeed generate secure keys with enough entropy by using the methods your mentioned, or just using your operating system's default source of entropy. The coldcard exploit was the result of very uncanny negligance... Using dice is just a way to avoid relying on a potentially vulnerable and unverifyable computation. Personally I've never used dice but I probably will in future just to be more sure.
Thats the right idea about a decoy wallet. If you play it right, you could convinve a cop/ criminal (same fucking thing really in this case) that there is no other wallet. Maybe they'll leave you alone then.

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Aug 26, 2026 5:09 PM
#6

@Nebuchadnezzar_II still shocked that stuff even exists. And wish I never found ouit it did

And something I forgot to ask. You mentioned being forced to give up a passord in the OP. Is that something you must do where your at? And what's the penalty if you refuse if you know?

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Aug 26, 2026 6:05 PM Edited Aug 26, 2026 6:06 PM
#7

@nemesis ahahaha.
I'm not sure what the penalty would be tbh. I suppose its safest to assume that they can force you to reveal it. I remember reading recently about a man who was prosecuted for providing a duress password that wiped encrypted data, but I think that that was an American case and I don't know the verdict.

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You are the only light

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Aug 26, 2026 6:16 PM
#8

@Nebuchadnezzar_II Oh he was an idiot for doing that. There is no requirement to give it up in the US. And no penalty either. The worst that would have happened to him is they take the device, and make him wait while they try to break into it. And on a frsh boot of Graphene along with USB disabled when locked,. they likely wouldn't have gotten in. And assuming he didn't have the CSAM he was accused of, even if they did, he would have been on his way in a few hours. We are given 'the right to remain silent', as well as 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Plus, it literally impossible to make someone write or speak words (which is why biometrics are a huge NO, they can put your finger on the reader or hold the phone to your face). He just failed to know of or assert his rights and allowed himself to be intimidated into it. I was just wondering what the laws were over your way on this matter. I know some countries are very strict with it and not giving up a password does carry legal penalties.

On the plus side with that case though, if he gets charges dropped or is aquitted, which is very possible with the right legal team, that sets a great precedent.

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1 thanks - Nebuchadnezzar_II - 0 tippers
Aug 26, 2026 6:30 PM
#9

@nemesis
https://inv.nadeko.net/watch?v=_2rokxux5cU
legaleagle

is not that "there is no law like that in the US"
is that "they can make up laws on the spot" type shit, and since was in airport then was international law that applied or somethin, some bullshit type shit lol, more complex issue there apparently

must have been priceless having police ego hurt so bad like :suprised-pikachu-face: when phone wiped from the pin they themselves entered x)

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Aug 26, 2026 6:51 PM Edited Aug 26, 2026 6:53 PM
#11

@GamingResearchLab There is no obligation to give up a password. There is no penalty for refusing to do so. We have the right to remain silent. Besides, how can they make you write or speak anything? Yea they can make shit up, like the CSAM accusation on this guy in question. But that's got nothing to do with the indisputable fact that you do not have to give up a password, and that alone there is no law about. I don't care what this YT video is about. It doesn't change anything.

From Customs and Border Controls own website

if the electronic device cannot be inspected because it is protected by a passcode or encryption or other security mechanism, that device may be subject to exclusion, detention, or other appropriate action or disposition. Additionally, the traveler may face longer processing times to allow for CBP to access the contents of the device.

https://www.cbp.gov/travel/cbp-search-authority/border-search-electronic-devices

Not a crime, and they cannot force you to do anything. Exactly as I explained already. I wasn't assuming anything. I got it from this exact website. And any defense attorney would tell you the same thing. You just shut up and say nothing. You can never be charged with exercising your Miranda rights, and good luck to any DA who tries.

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